The on-going genetically modified (GM) food and genetically modified organism (GMO) conaovccsy threaten to destroy the near-term market for agbiotech food and inputs and alter greatly the net social benefits that are potentially attainable from agriculcural biotechnology. For example, consider:
1. In February 2000 Greenpeace filed a lawsuit challenging the US Environmental Protection Agency's decision co allow the release of GM insect resistant (Bt) crops. In their news release they stated 'The EPA should stop [GE] polluters before the environment is threatened' (Greenpeace, 2000a) . 2. During the week of 23 March 2000 Greenpeace joined over 50 other organizations in a petition to the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) calling on the agency to remove genetically engineered (GE) foods from the market because it failed co require safety testing or labelling (Greenpeace, 2000b) . 3. In 1998, the European Union sec our co update Council Directive 90/220 covering the deliberate release of GMOs. In the spring of 2000, the EU decided not co approve any more releases until the directive is revised. 4. During 1999, more than 50% of chc crop biotcch field experiments in the UK were disrupted by anti-GMO activists.
Nerdccon (1999) states that the anti-biotech activists have achieved a masterful feat in communication, subverting chc purpose of biotechnology, whipping up public alarm and feeding political agendas to protccc agricultural markets.
Advances in science enable new technologies and advances in technology increase the demand for science. Advancing science and technology arc uncertain and costly activities (Holmsaom, 1989; Huffman and Evenson, 1993; Huffman and Just, 2000) . Although some new technologies have benefited society greatly, much uncertainty surrounds most new technologies. For example, little accurate information or knowledge exists about the attributes, including effects, of new ag-biotcchnologies, and some of the knowledge/information thac does exist is public information and some private. 1 Additional research can be undertaken to increase the knowledge about the beneficial and harmful effects of new technologies, some of which will reduce the uncertainty over future irreversible catastrophes. Advances in communication and information networks make possible rapid worldwide dissemination of public scientific discoveries and other information. Private informacion is the source of asymmetric information, and it leads to an informacional advantage co the parry possessing the information. In two parry interactions with one parry possessing private information, the informed parry can be expected to exercise their informational advantage whenever they can expect to gain from it, and the other parry loses. When experienced parties develop intuition about siruarions potentially leading to opportunistic behaviour of others, asymmetric information can destroy trade/exchange between parties where chc potential gains from trade/exchange are large.
The objective of this chapter is to examine the welfare cffeas of information from communication (by interested parties) on the decisions of producers of agricultural products and potential users of biotechnical inpucs and on consumers of agrobiotechnical products. Interested panics arc considered to be private biotechnical companies whose profics depend positively on sales of GM inputs to agricultural producers and 'environmental groups' whose ucilicy depends positively on the quancicy and qualicy of environmental stocks. The ag-biocech companies provide or distribute information primarily in advertising, news releases, informational brochures and web sires, personal contaccs and demonscracions. The environmental groups provide or distribute information primarily in news releases, informarional web sites and demonstrations. Final consumers of agricultural products and agricultural producers that might use GM inputs are assumed co be approximately 'neutral parties' in chis communication process, but they face important decisions relating to their own welfare. 2 We acknowledge that other possibly more trusted sources of information exist for producers and consumers, and the chapter focuses on the importance of these sources to good decision making. 3 We will show thac verifiable information plays a central role in socially good decision making and that an independent agency should score and make freely available verified information. This agency mighc also engage in research needed to refute or confirm claims made by interested parties and ochers.
The Model
Many decision makers must or choose to rely on information provided by individuals or groups who arc affected by their decisions. Furthermore, these decision makers may nae know the alternatives available and have no control over the information provided to them by interested parties. These interested parties may manipulate by distocring or concealing informacion. For example, farmers rely on information, including advertising, provided/distributed by biotech companies about the expected performance of new biocech inpucs, which is quite selecrive. These firms are constrained somewhat by an interest in repeat sales, but their communication may nae reflecc accuracely all known impaccs. Consumers rely on information and advertising distributed by food companies and environmcnral groups which seem likely co be tinged with self. interest. For example, communications by Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth opposing GM foods may exaggerate the potential harm to the environment and distract from other important issues.
Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and ocher environmental groups are interest groups. Individuals self-select into these groups because of a common interest or goal focused on the environ-1 Sec Frey (2000) for a discussion of some of the prospeas and problems associated with the use of biotechnology in plant breeding.
2 Hoban (1997 Hoban ( , 1999 shows that food safety concerns from biotechnology arc rated relatively low by consumers in the USA, Western Europe and japan, relative to microbial contamination, pesticide residuals and antibiotics or hormones. 3 Although Hoban (1996) reported that ag-biotcch companies and activist groups arc not ranked high by US consumers as a trusted information source, this docs not mean that they never use any of the information in decision making. In The Netherlands, a survey of the general public showed that cnvironmcnral and consumer organizations were seen as the most reliable sources of information on biotechnology (Hcijs and Midden, 1996) . In the UK, Marcin and Tait (I 992) found that in a local community reaction to a GMO release, the public chose to support the perspective provided by Greenpeace. ment, and achieving the group's goal is a public good to its members. Hence, free-riding by one member on the efforts of other members is a major organizational problem (Olson, 1965; Sandler, 1992; Cornes and Sandler, 1996: 324-326) . Each of these groups has resources -largely members' time and financial contributions -and their impact is affected by organizational efficiency. By choosing relatively narrow objectives, these groups reduce coordination and decision making costs over organizations chat have diverse goals. Advances in communication and information technologies have greatly reduced organizational costs of interesr groups and have undoubtedly increased their productivity. They are now able to construct low cost web sites for displaying their objectives, news releases, shon articles and other information. For example, the web site of Friends of the Earth has been used to display the locations or addresses of largescale plantings of GMO crops in England (Friends of the Earth, 2000) . These groups can also use email to rapidly distribute communications among members, for example dealing with demonstrations, and others, such as lercers opposing GMO use and policies. 4 In our model, the two interested parties provide information in the form of communicarions arcempting ro affect agricultural producers' and consumers' decisions. The communications are signals which reflect the self-interest and private information of each party. Communication is cheap because it requires little action on the part of the sender, and new information technologies, such as e-mail and web sites, have reduced its cost and greatly increased the swili:ness of delivery. There remains some modest fixed cost of preparing a communication, but the marginal cost of distributi ng it has become approximately i.ero (Shapiro and Varian, 1999: 19-51) . Misinformation can be as easily distributed as useful information. Computer viruses, like 'I Love You', are one example of misinformation which can be sent swili:ly around the world and clog the information network. In particular, the new information technology has greatly expanded the possibility of individuals communicating with others whom they do not know personally and from whom they may have greatly different norms and values. Hence, new problems with assessing the quality of information obtained from web sites and e-mail have arisen (World Bank, 1999: 72-81) . Because signalling with communications is so cheap, one possible outcome is char they degrade the quality of information to the poinr char communications from interested panics are ignored.
Although the marginal cost of distributing information is approximately i.ero, it remains costly for decision makers to interpret this information, especially contradictory information. Consumers and agricultural producers, however, differ in the long-term consequences of using bad information. Consumers maximize utility subject to a resource constraint. When they fail to use objective information in decision making, their utility or well-being decreases, but this does not generally cause them ro exit the economy (except when the consequence is death). Producers on the other band can be described as long-run profit maximii.ers. If they do not use good information, their profits are reduced.
If they become negative over the long term, most likely they will be forced to exit the industry. Thus, there is selectivity operating among farmers that is generally different from char of consumers. For consumers and producers, the ability ro process information and make good decisions is a valuable skiU in the sense that it can be welfare or profit increasing, and this ability seems most likely to be related to their years of schooling and accumulated experience as decision makers (Huffman, 2002) . Given some outlay on information, a decision maker might choose ro rely on only one interested party in making their decisions, or they might choose to rely on several interested parties possessing different points of view. There are potential cosrs and benefits of each of these actions.
Although Milgrom and Roberts ( 1986) have shown that it is possible for a decision maker to make fully informed decisions when rhe decision maker relies on one interested parry for information, the necessary conditions seem quite restrictive and are unlikely to be fulfilled. For example, the interested party's preferences must be known ro the decision maker, the information musr be freely verifiable, the decision maker must know the factors about which the interested party has information to be able to detect situations in which information is being withheld, and the decision maker must be able co draw the appropriate inference when information is withheld (i.e. he or she must be a sophisticated, sceptical decision maker). These arc demanding, but perhaps not impossible aruibutcs for successful agricultural producers to possess, but they seem to exceed the attributes of most consumers of food. The implication is that for agricultural producers (or consumers) co rely only on informatio n providcdldisscminatcd by biotech supply firms or environmental groups is unlikely co lead to fully informed decisions. Hence, good reasons exist for society to be sceptical of claims made by both the suppliers of ag-biotcch inputs and the environmental i merest groups.
Adding (having or allowing) competition among interested parties in providing information greatly reduces the restrictions or assumptions necessary for good decision making. The interested parties must be able to convey their information to the decision maker, and the decision maker must listen to all interested parties who want co convey information, chat is, there must be an opportunity for the different interests to come out. Ag-biotech firms, environmental groups and other interested parties seem likely to differ in their ability and effectiveness in conveying information that they have. This ability might be associated, among other things, with training, communication skills, personalities, o rganizational objective/philosophy and information technologies. 5 Rapid advances in communication and information technologies arc widely available coday, and with the dramatic fall in the cost of sending messages and storing information through new networks (Shapiro and Varian, 1999; World Bank, 1999) . accessibility co technologies seems minimally constrained by capital or credit. Biotech companies arc primarily private companies interested in longterm profits associated with the sales of their products and the value of the company, and the information that they distribute can be expected to be consistent with this long-term objective and co be constrained by it. Environmental groups arc pursuing non-monetary goals which seem likely co be less constraining on their actions and possibly on the objectivity of the information they distribute.
However, the decision makers can now be unsophisticated, having little or no idea of available options, of issues bearing on the decision or preferences of the interested parries. He or she mwt, however, be able to process the information that he or she receives, and the information mwt be verifiable. Under these conditions, fully informed decisions arc possible. The implication is that agricultural producers and consumers can make better decisions when they use information from diverse and possibly interested parries, provided the information is verifiable.
Much information being discributed these days about ag-bioccchnology, however, is not currently verifiable. First, biotechnology is advancing rapidly so many effects and impacts of new products are unknown. Second, a coalition of anci-biocccbnology interests has been fo rmed co slow the acceptance of ag-biotechnology. T hese groups have raised new questions about both the shon-ccrm and the longterm effects on health and the environment of using ag-biotechnology and consuming GM foods. Third, some of the activities of the anti-bioccch groups seem to be focused on disrupting the experiments that might lead to important and useful advances in the stock of knowledge about ag-biotcchnology.
When information is not verifiable, the reliability of information provided by an interested party (or panics) depends on the congruity between the objectives of the decision maker and chose of the interested party (parties). When objectives diverge, decision making is difficult, and these complex problems have been the topic of optimal incentive schemes in principal-agent or agency theory Literature (e.g. see Holmstrom, 1979; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987; Gibbons, 1998) . These models are, however, well suited only to decision problems with few, e.g. two, players.
When information is not verifiable, communications by interested panics might lead to unduly restrictive public policies being adopted (e.g. banning GM food production or imports) or it might degrade the information content to the extent that sophisticated decision makers ignore it. 6 This will, however, be generally wdfuc reducing relative to S ln dealings with strangers of unknown credibility and no binding conrracc, reputation based on providing accurate and reliable information is valuable. Sec Sobel (1985) for one perspective on how a concern about credibility can be cxpccccd to affect the quality of information provided co a decision maker over time. 6 The 4-ycar moratorium on processing patenr applications on transgenic plants and animals by the European Patent Office, which ended in December 1999 with a decision by the enlarged board of appeals, seems co have been a matter of interpretation of European Union directives and not of verifiable info rmation (Schecrmcicr and Dickson, 2000).
fully informed decision making. For example, social cost-reducing inputs for crop production might not be used by farmers, or socially beneficial GM foods might not be consumed. 7 More generally, long-term delays in adopting GM technologies because of the time required to verify or refute claims by the environmental groups about ag-biotcchnical products will reduce the expected social and private payoff ro R&D in this area. This has implications for where the private sector places its future R&D investments (Frey, 2000) , meeting future food needs and for economic growth.
When a large number of decision makers can use or need the same verified information, research ro produce this information produces a public good, which may be of great social value. The knowledge once produced is non-rival, chat is, use by one decision maker docs not affect the quantity or quality available ro others, and it is not (or may not be) economically feasible to exclude users. Because the opportunity cost of an added user of the information is zero and each user's valuation of the information is private information, private decisions will lead to under provision unless some organizational device is used to internalize externalities associated with free-riding. The price system is of no (or lirtlc) aid in extracting information on the social value of verified information or a system to manage ir.
Institutionalizing a Verified Information System
An ideal verified information system for ag-biotcchnology muse provide a mechanism for disclosing private information (i.e. information or knowledge that exists but is nor available ro everyone), establish a p rocess for refuting or confirming claims of interested parties, and advance the stock of knowledge about short-and long-term effects of biotechnology. 8 The size of rhc problem is large because agbiotcchnology is a global intergenerational public good. Biotech knowledge is non-rival and nonexcludablc on a global basis, although particular techniques and products have been converted into impure public goods through the institution of parenting and international patent agreements. Furthermore, the impacts (benefits and hazards) arc multi-generational -in terms of both potential benefits and hazards. Although most of the currently available agbiotechnologies have been developed for large-scale agriculture and high income consumers, the potential exisrs for ag-biorechnology to help low income councries to meet future food needs (Serageldin, 1999; National Research Council, 2000) and many of the low income countries want access to or to have the opportunity ro use ag-biotechnology to help meet their future food needs (OECD, 2000) . Hence, reliable information on ag-biorechnology is a public good with potentially large global value.
Because new ag-biorcchnology has the potential ro produce benefits and realize hazards over the long term, it has an intergenerational dimension. This means that sequencing of generations becomes important in setting policies and determining benefits; that is, both equity and efficiency dimensions are important. The current generation has a 'firsrmovcr' ad van rage because it can choose an agenda or pathway thar best serves its own purposes, even though these purposes may be at odds with later generations (Sandler, 1997) . T his is an especially important issue for actions chat are irreversible; for example, reducing the earth's biodiversity, and for some transfers of genes across unrelated species. Farsighted decisions can be promoted by including individuals/representatives distributed over wide age and standard ofliving ranges in decision making on ag-biorech policy and by evaluating costs and benefits of biotechnology in real terms without discounting.9
Some mechanisms for revealing private information lead to better decisions than ochers. When a product's 'quality' is at issue, 'untruthful' advertising 7 As an indication of bendics from agriculrural biotechnology, Falck-Zcpada tt al (2000a) estimate the first-year wotldwide economic surplus from the introduction of Be cotton in the USA was US$240 million. The economic surplus co herbicide tolerant soybeans is larger (see Moschini tt al, 1999; Falck-Zepeda tt al, 2000b) . In the surplus computations, biocech inpucs arc treated as having neutral effeccs on human health and the environment. Sec Alston tt al (1995) for more information on methods of social cost-benefit analysis dealing with research. 8 Avery et al (2000) arc concerned with a much narrower issue. They propose a compuccrizcd market for the collect ion and discribucion of subjcccive evaluations of a product of uncertain quality purchased by consume!$. 9 Discounting seems co be a qucscionable practice for social cost-benefit analysis that spans several gencracions because with discounting at any positive race, the current weight co a distant generation' s disaster is very small (and frequently negligible). Sec Sandler (1997: 62-69).
tends to lead co a breakdown in the market for the good and no trade occurs because of adverse selection; for example Akerlofs 'market for lemons ' (Akcrlof, 1970; Molho, 1997: 19-26) . With 'truthful' advertising, monitored effectively by an independent body, good market performance is obtained. Privately provided information on the route to reputation building and repeat sales is less effective for simple 'quality' issues (Molho, 1997: 52-53), and it can be expected to be quite deficient in the biotech area where the scientific issues are frequently complex, the quality dimensions are frequently changing and the stock of knowledge is steadily advancing. Private information is best revealed publicly through an independent agency which has the authority and responsibility to independently verify information from interested parties. An independent agency can go about making objective assessments of information and claims made by interested parcies and others. These assessments and evaluations are costly to make because they use scarce resources, but once verified the information is a pure public good. New information and communication technologies have greatly reduced the cost of storing and rapidly transferring this information and greatly increased the potential accessibility co a global scale.
Advances in the stock of knowledge arc important to a successful information verification system. le expands the topics, issues or dimensions of the knowledge base on which verification can be made. The primacy contributors to this activity seem likely to be scientists employed by commercially independent institutions and funded primarily by the public sector, that is, scientists in 'open universities' and possibly government agencies. An open university is one where the direction and funding of research is not driven primarily by commercial interests or any other narrow interest group and where high scientific-control sca.ndards are in place (David, 2000; Huffman and Just, 2000) . Universities where the research agenda and/or funding has been captured by a single interest group, or one or more large private companies (e.g. a life science company), does not meet this criterion. Also, if the direction of the research programme of a government agency is driven heavily by commercial considerations or has low scientific-control standards, it will not meet the criterion of open and objective science either. For scientific discoveries to be highly supportive of the information verification system, they must originate from an institutional process that signals openness and objectiveness to disinterested parties.
Good research requires considerable time to undertake and to verify itself. When the frontiers of biological and related sciences are advancing rapidly, a significant period may exist where considerable scientific uncertainty exists about outcomes, effects, impacts or the quality of the information (see, e.g. Frey, 2000: 61-79) . Interested parties may anempt to exploit this information lag which can be to the detriment of producers and consumers of agricultural products and to society generally. An efficiently functioning knowledge generation and verification system can, however, shorten chis lag. By doing so, it creates an environment where interested parties have a strong incentive to reveal voluntarily more (rather than less) of the private information that they possess and where verified information is freely available and easily accessible. The cooperation of interested parties is achievable primarily because sophisticated decision makers would infer even worse outcomes (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986) .
No supernational body is likely to be created to provide verifiable information which is a global public good. Nations have been unwilling to empower such bodies with the authority co collect taxes for such purposes (Sandler, 1997) . For an individual country to provide the good, the social benefits must exceed the coses. The greater public good nature of verified information created by advances in information technologies means savings for some countries whose d ecision makers free-ride and weaker incentives for any one country to undertake the verification activiry. Only one good biotech verifiable information system is needed; or given one system, the marginal product of another system is zero.
In the public economics literature, chis has sometimes been labelled as 'best shoe' technology of public good supply aggregation (Sandler, 1998) . Thinking about a global coordination game across countries for provision of verifiable information, only one country needs to act. The country which has the largest expected nee social benefit from action, or largest stake, can be expected to provide a biotech verifiable information system. This seems likely to be a country with a strong research system, a large ag-biocech industry, a technically advanced large-scale agriculture, large population, high price of time (for acquiring and evaluating information) and high income.
Trust in Public Institutions
Because a verifiable biorechnology information system must be financed by public ra.x collections, ir mosr likely will be operated by one or more government agencies. 1° For this institutional framework ro be successful, it musr have the trust of the public. Currently agencies of narional governments dealing with similar issues in Wesrern developed countries vary in the amount of trust or confidence that the public places in informarion that they provide.
In the USA, public trust is high, bur in Western European countries public trust is low.
Gaskell et al (1999) reporrs on a survey of the US public showing a high level of trusr in information dealing with the safety of biotechnology provided by the USDA and FDA. Also, Hoban (1997) reports on a 1994 survey of the US public where respondents were asked to rank 15 different sources of information on agricultural biotechnology for trustworthiness. The National Institutes of Health and Food and Drug Administration ranked very high: second and third. 11 (The USDA and EPA were not included in the reported rankings.) For Europe, Gaskell et aL ( 1999) report on a survey of the public in 17 European countries showing low rrusr in national public bodies 'to rell the truth about GM crops grown in fields'. European governments have accumulated a bad record with the general public on food safety issues because of their pasr experiences dealing with governments that mishandled information on UK BSE meat and dioxin contamination of dairy and poultry products in Belgium and The Netherlands. Decision making by producers and consumers is made more difficult when government agencies cannot be trusted as a verifiable information source.
Current public information systems in place in the USA and Europe dealing with information on agricultural biotechnology are primarily focused on regulation for environmental and health safety and secondarily focused on proving information ro consumers rhrough labelling. In the USA, the regulation of biotechnology products is through the Coordinated Framework established in 1986 {National Research Council, 2000a) which ties together the US Department of Agriculture (USDA), Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The framework is based on rhc principle that techniques of biotechnology arc not inherently risky and that biorechnology should not be regulared as a process, bur rarhcr thar the produces of biotechnology should be regulated in the same way as products of other technologies. Responsibility and jurisdicrion over rransgenecic products were assigned as follows: (i) planes came under rhe jurisdiction of the Federal Planr Pest Act (FPPA) adminisrcred by the USDA; (ii) food and feed under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmcric Act (FFDCA) administered by the FDA; and (iii) microorganisms and subsrances used for pest control under the jurisdiction of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and pan of FFDCA administered by the EPA. As new biotech products have been developed, environmental and consumer groups have expressed concerns that EPA rules do not adequately cover all the relevant risk issues (e.g. oral toxicity, potential for allergenicity) and the USDA should examine more thoroughly for risks of new plants outcrossing IO The exchange of information and clearing house mechanism under the 1993 Convcncion on Biological Diversity have a somewhat diffcrcnc focus. The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity has as objectives the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources. The Convention wcnc into effect in December 1993 with 168 signing countries (the USA being absent). Anicle 17 requires that members facilitaee the exchange of information relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, including results from technical, scicncific and social research and other information. Article 18 requires the establishment of a clearing house mechanism to promote and facilitate technical and scicncific cooperation (Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992; www.biodiv.org/chm/conv/cbd_text_e.hanl). Both of these articles arc to facilitate access ro and exchange of information on biodiversity around the world, especially information needed to implement provisions of the Convention. Although the exchange of information and clearing house activities facilitate voluntary sharing of information on biodiversity, they arc nor actively involved in quality concrol or verification. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety was adopted in January 2000 to address environmental (but not food safety) impacrs of bio-cnginccred products that cross international borders. The Protocol establishes an Internet-based Biosafety Clearing-House to help member countries exchange scientific, technical, environmental and legal information about living modified organjsms. 11 However, in 1999, US environmental activists and some consumer groups intensely criticized and demonstrated against the FDA's GM food policies (Macilwain, 1999) .
with wild relatives co produce unusually hardy weeds or adversely affect biodiversity (National Research Council, 2000a) . Labelling for GMO content has nor been adopted in the USA, hue indircccly information will be provided in a new USDA standard for 'organic food' labelling (Golan tt al, 2000) . For crops, the standard means thac the use of generic engineering, irradiation and sewage sludge in the production or processing stages is prohibited. Although all organic farmers and handlers would be expected co abide by chc standard, ic remains co be seen whether che standard can be effectively enforced.
For countries in the European Union (EU), the EU has established polices as directives co member nations on environmental legislation. The EU Directive on the Contained Use of Generically Modified Organisms (Directive 90/219/EEC) and on Deliberate Release (Directive 90/220/EEC) arrempr co establish a system for controlling the use of GM organisms (European Commission, 2000) . The directives were modelled after the EU's chemical notification directives. Since these EU directives arc nor implemented uniformly across member countries and no central monitoring authority exists, the system is somewhat loosely controlled.
Directive 90/219/EEC provides common rules throughout the EU for the use of GM microorganisms in research laboracories and industrial facilities and provides appropriate measures ro procccc human health and the environment from any risks arising from activities using GM microorganisms. The Directive ouclines appropriate procedures for risk management. Microorganisms and activities using them arc co be classified by their potential for risk and ro containment and control measures. Each coumry must designate 'competent authorities' co receive information from commercial companies and research institutes. These auchoriries must organize inspection and other control measures. They muse also examine the conformity of notifications received with che requirements of che directives. Effeaivc risk management is expected, and ir means chat a careful risk assessment of contained use muse be made, the appropriate level of containment muse be exercised and suitable preventive measures muse be taken (European Commission, 2000) .
Directive 90/220/EEC covers deliberate release of GM organisms into the environment for research and development purposes and chc placement on the marker of produces containing GMOs. The directive takes a preventive approach, emphasizing prior assessment and approval. The main elements are: (i) an environmental risk assessment muse be carried our before any experimental or commerci. al releases of GMOs into the environment; (ii) no release can be carried out withour rhc consenr of rhc competent authority; (iii) an approval procedure by a narion's compercnt aurhoriries should limir experimental releases to ar most 90 days; and (iv) EU Community approval is required for commercial releases of GM Os (European Commission, 2000) .
The larrcr procedure has been implemented as follows (Maurer and Harl, 2000) . On receipt of rhe notification, the competent authority in a member country has 90 days ro either forward the notification dossier co chc European Commission with a favourable opinion or inform the notifier char the proposed commercial release does nor fulfil the requirements of the directive. After receiving a notification dossier, chc Commission immediately forwards ic co the competent authorities of all other member stares. If no objection is raised by the competent authorities of these states within 60 days after the commission forwards the notification, the competent authority char first received che notification issues a wrirccn consent co the applicant and informs the other member countries and the Commission of the consent. When member countries do nor reach agreement on a nocificacion, the Commission draws on relevant scientific comminees for information and opinions. After weighing this information, che Commission makes a decision which is binding on all EU mcmbers. 1 z Individual countries arc also urged co have effcaive penalties for improper release of GM Os, bur none has been established.
Public confidence in EU GMO policies has been undermined by recent information char unapproved GMOs have been sold in some EU countries and planted by farmers; for example, oilseed rape in several countries and conon in Greece and Spain (Greenpeace, 2000c,d The EU's labelling policy has been controversial. First, proven safecy risk evidence is generally lacking. Second, the scientific meaning of'none' has been controversial in an era where rapid advances in scientific instrumentation has made it possible to detect ever smaller units, and accidental physical mixing of GMO and non-GMO commodities can easily occur. Third, the requirements for restaurants and caterers is so low as to be virtually useless to interested consumers.
Conclusions
This chapter has addressed the economics of information as it affects the acceptance of and benefits from agricultural biotechnology. We have shown that the producers and consumers can make good decisions on acceptance and use of GM produets if there is freely accessible, verifiable information and competition in the provision of information by interested parties. However, when information is not verifiable and decision makers must rely on interested parties, achieving good decisions is much more difficult. Ag-biotech companies, environmental groups and others seem likely to have interests that d iverge from those of consumers and producers and to use private information strategically, especially when the supply of new GM products is advancing rapidly. Furthermore, rapid advances in communication and info rmation technologies have greatly reduced the cost and increased the speed with which info rmation can be distributed. The private information that these groups have can cause the market for GM products in one way or another to collapse. T his may be at considerable loss in social welfare.
We have argued that the services provided by an institutionalized information verification system operated by an independent body would be a mechanism for producing good public information services that would have large social value. This institution would reveal private information, establish a process for refuting or confirming claims of interested parties and advance the stock of knowledge on short-and long-term effects of biotechnology. Advances in the stock of knowledge arc important to a successful information verification system because it can expand the topics, issues o r dimensions of the knowledge base on which verification can be made. The primary contributors to this activicy seem likely to be scientists employed by commercially independent institutions, funded primarily by the public sector and working to meet scholarly and scientific standards.
The relevant categories of information would cover topics consistent with a broad range of income and intergenerational interests. To obtain and maintain public trust, it must be 'consumer driven' and broader than pure scientific issues, although they would be one important component. It would, however, include scholarly presented and summarized information on ethical, social, economic, environmental, food safccy, scientific and trade issues dealing with GMOs.
Verified information is costly to produce, bur once provided, it has international public good amibutes. We have argued that the advances in information and communication technologies have increased rhe free-rider problem by weakening the incentives for any one country to undertake such activities. We suggest that the provision will most likely be by some large country that stands currently to receive a significant share of the net social benefits from a verifiable information system for agbiorechnology.
C urrently, public institutions dealing with regulating GMOs and labelling in the USA have relatively high public trust but none fulfils our conceptual view of a verifiable information system. Public bodies in Europe are experiencing low public trust as an info rmation source, and this is undoubtedly making good decision making more difficult. An effective information system dealing with biotechnology must be managed well in order to provide large social benefits.
